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Abstract 
The author develops a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model with an active 
banking sector, a financial accelerator, and financial frictions in the interbank and bank 
capital markets. He investigates the importance of banking sector frictions on business 
cycle fluctuations and assesses the role of a regulatory capital requirement in propagating 
the effects of shocks in the real economy. Bank capital is introduced to satisfy the 
regulatory capital requirement, and serves as collateral for borrowing in the interbank 
market. Financial frictions are introduced by assuming asymmetric information between 
lenders and borrowers that creates moral hazard and adverse selection problems in the 
interbank and bank capital markets, respectively. Highly leveraged banks are vulnerable 
and therefore pay higher costs when raising funds. The author finds that financial 
frictions in the interbank and bank capital markets amplify and propagate the effects of 
shocks; however, the capital requirement attenuates the real impacts of aggregate shocks 
(including financial shocks), reduces macroeconomic volatilities, and stabilizes the 
economy. 
JEL classification: E32, E44, G1 
Bank classification: Economic models; Business fluctuations and cycles; Financial 
markets; Financial stability 
Résumé 
L’auteur élabore un modèle d’équilibre général dynamique et stochastique qui comporte 
un secteur bancaire actif, un accélérateur financier et des frictions financières sur le 
marché interbancaire et le marché des fonds propres bancaires. Il cherche à déterminer 
l’importance des frictions du secteur bancaire dans les fluctuations économiques et 
évalue le rôle des exigences réglementaires en matière de fonds propres dans la 
propagation des effets des chocs au sein de l’économie réelle. Les fonds propres 
bancaires sont introduits pour satisfaire aux exigences réglementaires, et ils servent de 
garantie d’emprunt sur le marché interbancaire. Les frictions financières sont introduites 
sous l’hypothèse d’une asymétrie d’information entre prêteurs et emprunteurs qui crée 
des problèmes d’aléa moral et d’antisélection sur le marché interbancaire et le marché des 
fonds propres bancaires, respectivement. Les banques à fort levier financier sont 
vulnérables et, par conséquent, se financent à coût plus élevé. L’auteur constate que les 
frictions financières sur les deux marchés amplifient et propagent les effets des chocs; par 
contre, les exigences en matière de fonds propres atténuent l’incidence réelle des chocs 
globaux (dont les chocs financiers), réduisent les volatilités macroéconomiques et 
stabilisent l’économie. 
Classification JEL : E32, E44, G1 
Classification de la Banque : Modèles économiques; Cycles et fluctuations économiques; 
Marchés financiers; Stabilité financière 1. Introduction
The large and persistent impact of the 2007{09 ¯nancial crisis on global real activity has un-
derscored the need to develop dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium (DSGE) models with
real-¯nancial linkages and an active banking sector. The models used by policy-makers, which
typically abstract from ¯nancial frictions, have not been useful for understanding the impli-
cations of the ¯nancial crisis. Therefore, there is growing consensus among macroeconomists
about the need to incorporate both banking intermediation and ¯nancial market frictions into
the macroeconomic DSGE models.1 Such models would allow an empirical evaluation of banks'
behaviour in the transmission and propagation of supply and demand shocks, and an assessment
of the importance of ¯nancial shocks, originating in the banking sector, as a source of business
cycle °uctuations. The banking sector has been ignored in most DSGE models developed in the
literature, except for some very recent papers.2 Moreover, in the literature, ¯nancial frictions
are usually modelled only on the demand side of the credit market, using either the Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999, BGG hereafter) ¯nancial accelerator mechanism or the Iacoviello
(2005) framework.3
The principal motivation of this paper is to introduce micro-founded ¯nancial frictions in
the interbank and bank capital markets into a New Keynesian DSGE model with a ¯nancial
accelerator µ a la BGG.4 The ¯nancial frictions are modelled by assuming imperfect information
(asymmetric information) between lenders and borrowers in both markets. In contrast to
Markovic (2006), Meh and Moran (2010), Hirakata, Sudo, and Ueda (2009), and Zhang (2009),
this paper introduces bank capital to satisfy the capital requirement exogenously imposed by
regulators, as in the Basel II Accord.5 In this accord, banks must hold a minimum of bank
capital to be able to provide risky loans to entrepreneurs. This requirement causes bank capital
1In light of the recent ¯nancial crisis, real-¯nancial linkages have become the focus of an increasing number
of papers. See Arend (2010) for more details about the recent papers.
2For example, C¶ urdia and Woodford (2010); de Walque, Pierrard, and Rouabah (2010); Gertler and Karadi
(2010); Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010); Zhang (2009).
3For example, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997); Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004); Christensen and Dib
(2008); Van den Heuvel (2008).
4This paper extends Dib's (2010) model by proposing a fully micro-founded framework, in that all banks
maximize pro¯ts and take optimal decisions under di®erent constraints.
5de Walque, Pierrard, and Rouabah (2010), Gerali et al. (2010), and Van den Heuvel (2008) also introduce
bank capital under an exogenous requirement.
1to attenuate the real e®ects of di®erent shocks. For instance, an increase in borrowing demand
by entrepreneurs, induced by a drop in the monetary policy rate, forces banks to increase
their leverage ratio and/or bank capital holdings. A higher leverage ratio and/or higher bank
capital imply higher marginal costs of raising bank capital, and thus higher marginal costs of
producing loans. Consequently, banks charge a higher lending prime rate, which increases the
external ¯nancing costs of entrepreneurs and erodes the initial increase in demand for loans to
¯nance new investment.
To model the interbank market, we assume the presence of two types of banks, \savings"
and \lending" banks, that supply di®erent banking services and transact in the interbank
market.6 Savings banks are owned by risk-averse agents, and operate in a monopolistically
competitive market for collecting fully insured deposits from households. They set deposit
rates and supply the received deposits to lending banks in the interbank market. Lending
banks are risk neutral and perfectly competitive in the credit market. They borrow from the
interbank market and raise bank capital (equity) in the bank capital market in order to provide
loans to entrepreneurs. Bank capital is required to satisfy the capital requirement. Unlike the
existing literature, bank capital in this model is a necessary input and a perfect complement
to deposits in the production of loans. Lending banks optimally choose their leverage ratio
and optimally allocate interbank borrowing between loans to entrepreneurs and investing in
risk-free assets (government bonds). To borrow from the interbank market, lending banks use
their assets (including loans to ¯rms and government bonds) as collateral. We assume that
loans are risky assets, but accepted as collateral with a haircut.
We assume that lending banks are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. The realized return on
loans is observed costlessly only by lending banks, while savings banks must pay an agency
cost to observe it. The asymmetric information across savings and lending banks creates a
moral hazard problem in the interbank market. Therefore, the optimal debt contract in the
interbank market is risky. That is, when the idiosyncratic shock to the lending bank exceeds
a certain default threshold, the lending bank pays a ¯xed amount to the savings banks; but
it defaults if the idiosyncratic shock is below this threshold. In this case, savings banks pay
the agency costs and keep what remains of the defaulting lending bank's assets. Since lending
6The two di®erent banks are necessary to generate heterogeneity, which in turn leads to an interbank market
where di®erent banks can transact.
2banks are risk neutral, they absorb all of the risk by o®ering an interbank risk premium. This
risk premium depends on the ratio of total interbank borrowing to the risk-weighted lending
bank's assets.
In addition, we introduce imperfect information into the bank capital market by assuming
that there is an adverse selection problem between lending banks and investors in bank equity.
Investors cannot perfectly observe the bank capital position and the degree of riskiness of
lending banks. Therefore, lending banks use their excess bank capital (their bank capital bu®er,
which is bank capital held beyond the required level) to signal their positions. Well-capitalized
banks are those with a lower leverage ratio.7 These banks are relatively less risky, so they pay
lower costs when raising capital in the bank capital market. These costs are increasing in the
optimally chosen bank leverage ratio, which in equilibrium is lower than the maximum imposed
level. Consequently, banks with smaller leverage ratios are well capitalized and pay lower costs
when raising equity in the capital market. Through this channel, movements in banks' leverage
ratio a®ect business cycle °uctuations (Fostel and Geanakoplos 2009; Geanakoplos 2009).8
In the model, the economy is disturbed by the usual aggregate demand and supply shocks.
In addition, there are four shocks originating in the ¯nancial sector: riskiness, ¯nancial inter-
mediation, haircut, and money injection (unconventional monetary policy). Riskiness shocks
are modelled as shocks to the elasticity of the risk premium that a®ects the entrepreneurial ex-
ternal ¯nancing premium in the ¯nancial accelerator mechanism µ a la BGG. They are meant to
represent shocks to the standard deviation of the entrepreneurial distribution, as in Christiano,
Motto, and Rostagno (2010).9 Financial intermediation shocks are exogenous events that af-
fect credit supply, such as technological advances in the intermediation process, or perceived
changes in creditworthiness.10 Shocks to the haircut rate are interpreted as shocks to the inter-
bank market a®ecting the interbank risk premium. They re°ect the degree of con¯dence in the
7Repullo and Suarez (2009) develop a framework in which banks are unable to access equity markets in every
period. Therefore, by holding capital bu®ers today, banks reduce the possibility of decreasing their lending in
the future due to negative shocks to their earnings.
8The cost of bank capital depends on the bank's capital position. If banks hold excess capital, the marginal
cost of raising bank capital on the market is lower, since banks are well capitalized.
9These shocks may be interpreted as exogenous changes in the con¯dence of banks with credit risks in
borrowers or in the overall health of the economy.
10Examples of shocks to the ¯nancial intermediation process are advances in ¯nancial engineering, credit
rationing, and highly sophisticated methods for sharing risk.
3value of risky assets used as collateral for borrowing in the interbank market. Therefore, an
exogenous increase in the haircut reduces the value of risk-weighted assets used as collateral,
thereby increasing the costs of borrowing in the interbank market. Finally, as in de Walque,
Pierrard, and Rouabah (2010), we assume that the central bank injects liquidity (money) in
the interbank market. The injections of money are exogenously used by the central bank to
ease credit supply conditions in the banking system.
This model di®ers from Dib (2010) in terms of modelling the banking sector. First, we
formally introduce asymmetric information in the banking sector that creates a moral hazard in
the interbank market and an adverse selection problem in the bank capital market. The model
incorporates, therefore, a double moral hazard framework leading to two ¯nancial accelerator
mechanisms. Second, we assume that lending banks are perfectly competitive and subject to
idiosyncratic shocks a®ecting their return on loans to ¯rms. Finally, we allow the lending banks
to optimally allocate interbank borrowing between providing loans and purchasing government
bonds.
The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy and used to investigate the role of banking
intermediation and bank capital channels in the transmission of real e®ects of aggregate shocks.
Also, the model is simulated to evaluate the importance of ¯nancial shocks, originating in
the banking sector, in explaining macroeconomic °uctuations. The model is successful in
reproducing the dynamic e®ects of most key macroeconomic variables. We also ¯nd that bank
leverage is procyclical following demand and supply shocks, indicating that banks are willing to
expand more loans during booms and tend to restrict their supply of credit during recessions.
Interestingly, ¯nancial frictions in the interbank and bank capital amplify and propagate the
e®ects of shocks on output and investment. In contrast, the presence of bank capital, to satisfy
the capital requirement, acts as an important \attenuation mechanism" that dampens the real
e®ects of di®erent aggregate shocks.
For example, following an expansionary monetary policy shock, the cost of borrowing for
entrepreneurs falls, leading to an increase in entrepreneurs' net worth, which pushes down
the external risk premium, raises entrepreneurs' demand for loans, and increases investment.
Nevertheless, to expand their loans, lending banks have to increase their capital holdings to
satisfy the capital requirement, or increase their leverage ratio. Both actions are costly for
4lending banks and push up the marginal cost of raising bank capital in the ¯nancial market.
This raises the marginal cost of producing loans, and partially o®sets the initial drop in the
marginal cost triggered by the fall in the monetary policy rate. Consequently, the lending
rate declines by less, and ¯rms' demand for loans and investment increases by less. Thus,
under capital requirements the decline in the external ¯nance cost caused by an expansionary
monetary policy is partly o®set by the increase in the cost of raising bank capital. Therefore,
bank capital regulations reduce the ampli¯cation e®ects that arise from ¯nancial frictions in the
interbank and bank capital markets. This mechanism stabilizes the economy and reduces the
uncertainty related to di®erent structural shocks (particularly ¯nancial shocks). The simulation
results indicate that ¯nancial shocks cause business cycles and are a substantial source of
macroeconomic °uctuations.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 discusses
the parameter calibration. Section 4 reports the impulse responses. Section 5 o®ers some
conclusions.
2. The Model
The economy is inhabited by three types of households (workers, bankers, and entrepreneurs)
that di®er in their degree of risk aversion and their access to the ¯nancial markets, capital
producers, retailers, a central bank, and a government. The banking sector consists of two types
of heterogeneous banks: \savings" and \lending" banks. They o®er di®erent banking services
and transact in the interbank market. Savings banks are owned by risk-averse bankers and
are monopolistically competitive when collecting deposits from workers. In contrast, lending
banks are risk neutral and perfectly competitive in the credit market when providing loans to
entrepreneurs.11
11In Dib (2010), both savings and lending banks are monopolistically competitive and are subject to quadratic
costs when adjusting their retail interest rates. In addition, savings banks optimally allocate deposits between
interbank lending and government bonds.
52.1 Households
2.1.1 Workers
Workers derive utility from total consumption, Cw
t , and leisure, 1¡Ht, where Ht denotes hours
























where ' 2 (0;1) is a habit formation parameter, °w > 0 is a parameter denoting the workers'
risk aversion and the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption,
and & > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch wage elasticity of labour supply. The parameter ´ > 0
measures the weight on leisure in the utility function. et is a preference (taste) shock that
follows an AR(1) process.
We assume that workers save only in deposits in savings banks. A representative worker
enters period t with Dt¡1 units of real deposits that pay the gross non-contingent nominal
interest rate, RD
t , between t and t + 1.12 During period t, workers supply labour to the
entrepreneurs, for which they receive real labour payment WtHt, (Wt is the economy-wide real
wage). Furthermore, they receive dividend payments, ¦R
t , from retail ¯rms, as well as a lump-
sum transfer from the monetary authority, Tt, and pay lump-sum taxes to the government,
e Tw
t . Workers allocate their funds to private consumption and real deposits. Their budget
constraint, in real terms, is
Cw





t + Tt ¡ e Tw
t ; (3)
where ¼t = Pt=Pt¡1 is the gross CPI in°ation rate. A representative worker household chooses
Cw
t , Ht, and Dt to maximize its expected lifetime utility, equation (1), subject to the single-
period utility function, equation (2), and the budget constraint, equation (3). The ¯rst-order
conditions of this optimization problem are provided in Appendix A.
12In this economy, R
D
t is di®erent from the gross nominal rate of return on government bonds.
62.1.2 Bankers
Bankers (bank shareholders) own savings banks, from which they receive pro¯ts, and supply
bank capital (bank equity) to lending banks, which is used to satisfy a capital requirement
imposed by regulators. Bankers consume, save in non-contingent government bonds, and ac-
cumulate bank capital. It is assumed that bankers' preferences depend only on consumption

















where °b > 0 is a structural parameter denoting bankers' risk aversion and the inverse of the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. et is an AR(1) preference shock; this is the same shock
for workers and bankers.
Banker households enter period t with (1 ¡ ±Z
t¡1)Zt¡1 units of bank capital (equity) stock,
whose price is QZ
t in period t, where ±Z
t¡1 2 (0;1) is the fraction of bank capital diverted to
lending banks' managers for their own bene¯t at the end of period t ¡ 1, and Zt is the total
claims (bank equity or shares) held by bankers.13 Bank capital pays a contingent (risky) gross
nominal return rate RZ
t between t ¡ 1 and t. Bankers also enter period t with Bt¡1 units of
real government bonds that pay the gross risk-free nominal interest rate Rt¡1 between t ¡ 1
and t. During period t, bankers receive pro¯t payments, ¦sb
t , from savings banks, and pay
lump-sum taxes to the government, e Tb
t . They allocate their after-tax income to consumption
Cb
t, real government bonds Bt, and bank capital acquisition QZ
t Zt. We assume that bankers




























t ¡ e Tb
t : (6)
13In this economy, we assume that bankers invest in lending banks' capital, while bank managers run the
banks. The diversion of a fraction of bank capital can be interpreted as bonuses paid to bank managers that
reduce dividend payments to shareholders.
14These adjustment costs can be interpreted as entry costs to the ¯nancial market; for example, fees paid to
brokers.
7A representative banker chooses Cb
t, Bt, and Zt to maximize its expected lifetime utility,





































































t is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the bankers' budget constraint.
Equation (7) determines the marginal utility of the banker's consumption, equation (8)
relates the marginal rate of substitution to the real risk-free interest rate, and equation (9)
corresponds to the optimal dynamic evolution of the stock of bank capital.
Combining conditions (8) and (9) yields the following condition relating the risky return
on bank capital, RZ
t , to the risk-free interest rate, diversion rate on bank capital, changes in



































This condition shows that the expected risky return, RZ
t+1, is increasing in the diversion rate
on bank capital, ±Z
t , in the risk-free rate, Rt, and in the marginal cost of adjusting bank capital
between t and t ¡ 1. In addition, RZ







, and in the expected gain from adjusting bank capital in t rather than in
t + 1.
Condition (10) leads to the following channels through which movements in bank capital
a®ect the costs of credit supply and thus the real economy. The ¯rst is the price expectation
8channel, which arises from expectations of capital gains or losses from holding bank equity, due
to expected changes in the price of bank capital. The second is the adjustment cost channel,
which implies that it is costly for bankers to change their bank capital holdings. The adjustment
costs smooth the response of bank capital to aggregate shocks.15 Bankers will include these
costs into their expectations of the risky return on bank capital that they receive from lending
banks. The third channel is the diversion risk channel that arises from the existence of the
possibility that lending banks' managers divert a fraction of bank capital payment for their
personal bene¯t. Therefore, movements in bank capital, caused by macroeconomic °uctuations,
have direct impacts on the expected costs of bank capital (paid to bankers) and, consequently,
on credit supply conditions (the costs and quantities of loanable funds). Higher costs of raising




Savings banks refer to all ¯nancial intermediaries that are net lenders (creditors) in the inter-
bank market and are owned by risk-averse (households) bankers. We assume the existence of
a continuum of monopolistically competitive savings banks indexed by j 2 (0;1). Each bank j
collects fully insured deposits Dj;t from (households) workers and optimally sets the nominal
deposit interest rate RD
j;t as a markdown below the risk-free return rate, Rt. Savings banks
lend deposits in the interbank market to \lending banks" at the market-clearing interbank rate
RI
t, but pay an agency cost to monitor lending banks.
We introduce ¯nancial frictions into the interbank market by assuming that the return on
lending banks' loans to entrepreneurs is subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks.
Savings banks cannot observe the realized idiosyncratic shocks that a®ect lending banks unless
they pay an agency (monitoring) cost, which can be interpreted as the cost of bankruptcy (in-
cluding auditing, legal costs, and losses associated with asset liquidation) paid by the savings
bank. This asymmetric information between the two types of banks creates a moral hazard
problem in the interbank market, in that lending banks have the incentive to misreport the
15That is, in response to shocks, bank capital will adjust more slowly the higher the cost.
9realized return on loans provided to entrepreneurs.16 This implies that the optimal debt con-
tract in the interbank market is risky. Nevertheless, since lending banks are risk neutral, they
absorb all of the idiosyncratic risk and, in the end, savings banks get a risk-free return rate, Rt,
on their interbank lending.17 Nevertheless, savings banks are not protected against aggregate
shocks.
As in Gerali et al. (2010), given monopolistic competition and the imperfect substitution
between deposits, the jth savings bank faces the following deposit supply function, that is
increasing in the individual relative deposit rate, RD
j;t=RD










where #D > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between di®erent types of deposits.18 Also, when
setting the deposit interest rate, RD
j;t, savings banks are subject to quadratic adjustment costs.
These costs allow an interest rate spread (between deposit and policy rates) that evolves over












where ÁR > 0 is an adjustment cost parameter. The optimization problem of the jth savings

































16Following Townsend (1979), we assume that there exists a costly state veri¯cation problem for savings banks
when lending in the interbank market.
17The risk-free rate is equal to the interbank rate R
I
t minus the agency costs paid to monitor lending banks.
18This supply function from a representative savings bank is derived from the de¯nition of the aggregate supply
of deposits, Dt, and the corresponding deposit interest rate, R
D




















1+#D ; where Dj;t and R
D
j;t are, respectively, the supply
and deposit interest rates faced by each savings bank j 2 (0;1).
10subject to (11); where Rt is the gross nominal risk-free rate received by savings banks from
providing interbank loans. Because bankers are the sole owners of banks, the discount factor
is the stochastic process ¯t
b¸b
t, where ¸b
t denotes the marginal utility of bankers' consumption.
The jth savings bank optimally sets the deposit rate, RD
j;t, to maximize the °ow of its pro¯ts.
In symmetric equilibrium, where RD
j;t = RD
















































is the marginal cost of adjusting the deposit interest rate between t
and t ¡ 1.
This optimal condition de¯nes the deposit interest rate as a markdown below the risk-free
rate. Therefore, the spread between policy and deposit rates, Rt ¡ RD
t , is time varying and
increasing in the net marginal cost of adjusting the deposit rate across periods. Consequently,
this framework adds a new channel through which savings banks' behaviour a®ects credit
supply conditions and the real economy. In the presence of the nominal rigidity of deposit
rates, savings banks in°uence the intertemporal substitution of consumption across periods
and thus facilitate consumption smoothing.
2.2.2 Lending banks
There is a continuum of risk-neutral lending banks that are perfectly competitive in the credit
market. These banks borrow from savings banks and raise funds from bankers (shareholders)
in the form of equity (bank capital). To provide loans to entrepreneurs, lending banks must
maintain su±cient capital to satisfy the minimum regulatory capital requirement. Bank capital
is also used as part of the collateral when borrowing in the interbank market. The return on
bank loans is subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. We assume that the realized
return on loans is observed costlessly only by lending banks: the idiosyncratic shocks are
independent across time and lending banks, and distributed with log-normal distribution with
a mean of one.
11Let Dt =
R 1
0 Dj;tdj denote total interbank borrowing from savings banks. Lending banks
optimally allocate a fraction st of total interbank borrowing to lend to entrepreneurs and use
(1 ¡ st) to purchase government bonds. We assume that the stock of bank capital, Zt, priced
at QZ
t , is held by lending banks as government bonds. Therefore, the total risk-free asset held
by lending banks in period t is BL
t = (1 ¡ st)Dt + QZ
t Zt and it pays the risk-free interest rate
Rt.
As in Gertler and Karadi (2010), we assume that, during times of ¯nancial crisis, the central
bank may conduct unconventional monetary policy (quantitative monetary easing) by directly
injecting money, mt, into the lending banks. This allows the central bank to act as a lender of
last resort. Table 1 reports the lending bank's balance sheet in period t.
Table 1: Lending bank's balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Government bonds: BL
t Bank capital: QZ
t Zt
Loans: Lt Interbank borrowing: Dt
Money injection: mt
Other terms: (¡t ¡ 1)(stDt + mt)
The table shows that money injection, mt, and shocks to ¯nancial intermediation, ¡t, a®ect the
total value of lending banks' balance sheets, implying balance sheet expansion or contraction.
A. Asymmetric information in the interbank market
Because of the asymmetric information problem between savings and lending banks, the optimal
debt contract in the interbank market is risky. Therefore, when a lending bank's idiosyncratic
return shock exceeds a certain default threshold, the lending bank pays the interbank rate,
RI
t, to a savings bank; however, it will default if the idiosyncratic return shock falls below this
threshold. In this case, a savings bank pays an agency cost and gets to keep what remains of
the lending bank's assets. The defaulting bank's shareholders receive nothing. Thus, this type
of debt contract prevents any lending bank from misreporting its true realized return.
To borrow from the interbank market, a lending bank uses its assets as collateral. Assets
include government bonds, BL
t , and loans to entrepreneurs, Lt, which are risky assets. If a
lending bank defaults on its interbank borrowing, savings banks pay agency costs and seize its
12assets. We assume that savings banks accept loans|which are provided by lending banks to
entrepreneurs|as collateral, but subject to a haircut discount. This is to protect themselves
against unexpected °uctuations in the market values of these risky loans. Therefore, the risk-
weighted value of a lending bank's assets used as collateral is (1¡¹t)Lt+BL
t , where ¹t 2 (0;1)
is a time-varying haircut rate imposed by savings banks on risky assets.19
Given the agency cost, the default threshold, and the standard deviation of the distribution
of bank idiosyncratic shocks, the debt contract in the interbank market implies an endogenous
¯nance premium, ¨t (which we call an interbank premium hereafter). Similar to the ¯nancial
accelerator framework, this premium depends on the ratio of a borrower's interbank debt to
its risk-weighted asset value. Speci¯cally, the interbank ¯nance premium is assumed to have
the following reduced form:
rpB
t ´ ¨t =
µ
Dt




where ¨(1) = 1, ¨0(¢) > 0, and ¨00(¢) < 0; À > 0 is a parameter measuring the elasticity of
the interbank risk premium with respect to the ratio of interbank borrowing to lending banks'
risk-weighted assets. The interbank external ¯nance premium increases in total interbank
borrowing, Dt, as well as in the haircut rate, ¹t; however, it decreases in loans and risk-free
assets (i.e., Lt and BL
t , respectively). This interbank premium may also arise from a lack of
liquidity, which could occur when lending banks are unable to pay back their debt because
they hold only illiquid assets (loans to entrepreneurs). We assume that ¹t evolves according to
the following autoregressive process:
log(¹t) = (1 ¡ ½¹)log(¹) + ½¹ log(¹t¡1) + ²¹t; (15)
where ¹ 2 (0;1) is the steady-state value of ¹t, ½¹ 2 (0;1) is the autoregressive coe±cient, and
²¹t is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation ¾¹.
The cost of borrowing in the interbank market, the gross nominal interbank rate RI
t, de-
pends on the policy interest rate, Rt, the opportunity costs of savings banks, and the interbank
premium, ¨t. The interbank rate is
RI
t = Rt¨t: (16)
19The haircut rate reduces the value of loans used as collateral when borrowing on the interbank market. It
depends on the degree of riskiness of assets used as collateral. Because bank capital (held as government bonds)
and securities are risk-free assets, the haircut rate applied to both is zero.
13Therefore, ¯nancial frictions in the interbank market imply a time-varying spread between the
interbank rate and the policy rate (an interbank spread). This spread is given by the net
interbank premium, log(¨t) = log(RI
t) ¡ log(Rt), and °uctuates over the cycle. It increases
in agency costs, banks' default threshold, and the degree of riskiness in the banking system.
In normal times, °uctuations in the interbank spread are very small, but can be substantial
during times of ¯nancial stress.20
B. Asymmetric information in the bank capital market
We introduce an adverse selection problem into the bank capital ¯nancial market by assuming
that there is imperfect information between bankers and lending banks.21 When investing in
bank equity capital, bankers do not have complete information about lending banks' capital
positions and the degree of risk they are bearing.22 Lending banks could either be well capi-
talized and hold substantial excess bank capital beyond the minimum required level, or be in
a more vulnerable position where they are heavily leveraged, or holding excessive risky assets.
This imperfect information provides the incentive to lending banks to signal their capital
position to the ¯nancial market. This can be achieved by indicating their capital bu®er holding
(bank capital held beyond the minimum required level). This helps investors to distinguish
between well- and poorly capitalized banks. The cost of raising bank capital decreases when
banks hold excess bank capital. To prevent banks from taking excessive risk (including high
leverage and investing in very risky loans), bankers require a risk premium, in addition to the
expected return (RZ
t ), that depends on the lending banks' leverage ratio relative to the maxi-
mum imposed by regulators. Therefore, well-capitalized banks (i.e., those that hold substantial
excess bank capital) face lower costs when raising bank capital.
Lending banks face a capital requirement imposed by regulators, and so they must hold
a minimum amount of bank equity as a fraction of risky assets (loans). Taking into account
the maximum leverage ratio imposed by regulators, ¹ ·, lending banks optimally choose their
20C¶ urdia and Woodford (2010) examine the implications of time-varying spreads on the conduct of monetary
policy.
21See Morrison and White (2005), who discuss the role of capital requirements and adverse selection in the
banking sector. A recent study by Eisfeldt, Green, and Uhlig (2010) examines the role of adverse selection in
banking.
22Bankers cannot observe the realization of lending banks' idiosyncratic shocks. If a lending bank defaults,
savings banks will seize its bank capital, and bankers (shareholders) will lose their investment.
14leverage ratio, ·t, that is de¯ned as the ratio of loans to bank capital.23 We assume that a
lower-than-imposed leverage ratio entails the holding of excess bank capital, which reduces the
cost of raising bank capital.
The bank capital premium that banks pay depends negatively on the amount of excess
bank capital (the capital bu®er), and is given by the following reduced form:
rp·
t ´ ¥t =
µ






where » > 0 denotes the elasticity of the bank capital premium with respect to excess bank
capital holdings. This premium decreases with the level of the capital bu®er. The bank
capital premium is increasing in the optimally chosen leverage ratio, ·t, while it is decreasing
in both the maximum imposed ratio, ¹ ·, and in the market value of bank capital, QZ
t Zt.24 A
higher-leverage ratio (a lower bank capital bu®er) implies greater bank risk and vulnerability.
Therefore, shareholders require a higher bank capital premium, to be compensated for this
risk.
When ·t < ¹ ·, the bank's chosen leverage ratio is below the required level, its holding of
excess capital reduces the ¯nancing premium. Thus, the optimal choice of the bank's leverage
ratio a®ects the costs of lending directly through its impact on bank capital funding costs.
Nevertheless, as ·t ! ¹ ·, the bank's leverage ratio converges to the required level, the premium
that a bank has to pay substantially increases. In the event of a negative shock, banks will
deleverage by either reducing their loans to entrepreneurs or raising new bank equity.25
C. Production of loans
To produce loans for entrepreneurs, the representative lending bank uses a fraction of interbank
borrowing, stDt, plus any injection of money from the central bank (quantitative monetary
easing), mt, and the total market value of its bank capital, QZ
t Zt. In contrast to recent studies
that introduce bank capital into DSGE models, we assume that bank capital is a perfect
23Note that ·t is de¯ned as the ratio of risky assets held by banks (loans to entrepreneurs) to bank capital





@¹ ·t < 0, and
@¥t
@Zt < 0.
25Banks can achieve deleveraging objectives by either reducing their loans to entrepreneurs or raising extra
bank capital; however, in this framework, the costs of raising new capital are very high, forcing banks to reduce
their loans.
15complement to interbank borrowing because it is used to satisfy the capital requirement.26
This complementarity implies that bank capital acts as an attenuation mechanism, rather than
an ampli¯cation mechanism. Therefore, as in Dib (2010), we assume that lending banks use a







where ·t < ¹ · is the bank's optimally chosen leverage ratio. ¡t represents a ¯nancial interme-
diation shock a®ecting the supply of loans, and is thus a shock to the balance sheet of lending
banks. It represents exogenous factors such as perceived risk, or technological advances in
¯nancial intermediation. For example, banks may underevaluate (overevaluate) risk during
booms (recessions), which exogenously increases (decreases) the loan supply.28 It is assumed
that mt and ¡t evolve according to AR(1) processes, where the steady-state value of mt is zero,
while that of ¡t is equal to unity.29
The marginal cost of producing loans is the weighted sum of the marginal cost of inter-
bank borrowing and the marginal cost of raising bank capital. Loan expansion requires either
adopting a higher-leverage ratio or an increase in bank capital holdings. Therefore, a higher
demand for bank capital or a higher-leverage ratio implies higher costs of raising bank capital,
thereby increasing the marginal cost of producing loans and borrowing costs for entrepreneurs.
These extra costs partly dampen the initial demand for loans and investment.
As in Dib (2010), we assume that lending bank managers divert a fraction, ±Z
t , of bank
capital to their own bene¯t, which reduces dividend payments to banks' shareholders. The
diversion of a fraction of bank capital entails convex penalties (costs) paid in the next period.













26Examples of recent studies are Meh and Moran (2010), Hirakata, Sudo, and Ueda (2009), and Zhang (2009).
In these studies, bank capital is introduced to solve asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers,
and is assumed to be a perfect substitute to deposits in loan production (loans are the sum of bank capital and
deposits).
27Leontief technology implies perfect complementarity between deposits and bank capital when producing
loans, and satis¯es the capital requirement.
28The process of loan evaluation certainly has evolved over time, through technological advances in information
services. Advances in computational ¯nance and sophisticated methods of sharing risk are examples of this shock.
29See Dib (2010) for more details.
16where Â±Z > 0 is a parameter determining the steady-state value of ±Z
t .
The lending bank's optimization problem is to choose st, ·t, and ±Z
t to maximize its pro¯ts,





















t = (1 ¡ st)Dt + QZ
t Zt, equation (14) and equations (17){(19). RL
t is the gross
nominal lending rate that represents the return on loans between t and t + 1, and so the total
return on loans is RL
t Lt. The term Rt(1 ¡ st)Dt represents the total return on the fraction of






t Zt is the cost of
bank capital, which depends on the cost of raising bank equity less the return on holding bank
capital as government bonds. The term Rtmt denotes the cost of money injections received
from the central bank.
The ¯rst-order conditions of this optimization problem with respect to st, ·t, and ±Z
t are:
RL
t = Rt + RtÀ
µ
Dt





t ¡ Rt¨t = »
µ
















where ¨t > 1 is the interbank risk premium. In addition, the Leontief technology implies the
following implicit demand functions for interbank borrowing and bank capital:
Lt = (stDt + mt)¡t; (23)
Lt = ·tQZ
t Zt¡t: (24)
Equation (20) is the optimal condition for allocating a fraction of interbank borrowing to
government bonds. It states that lending banks optimally choose st, so that the marginal cost
is equal to the marginal cost of investing in government bonds. In this framework, the marginal
cost is given by RL
t , the opportunity cost of not extending loans. The marginal gain is given by
the right-hand terms in equation (20); it is the sum of the return on investing in government
17bonds and the decrease in the interbank risk premium caused by the additional holding of risk-
free assets used as collateral when borrowing in the interbank market. The fraction of interbank
borrowing invested in government bonds increases in interbank borrowing, the interbank rate,
and the policy interest rate, but it decreases in the lending rate, loans, and bank capital.
Therefore, to reduce the cost of borrowing, banks can substitute bank capital by holding more
risk-free assets. This explains why banks hold government bonds, despite the fact that they
are dominated by other types of assets.
Equation (22) is the optimal condition determining the evolution of the bank leverage
ratio, ·t; it depends on the maximum imposed leverage ratio ¹ ·, the policy rate, the interbank
premium, the lending rate, the risky return on bank capital, and the market value of bank
capital. The leverage ratio is optimally chosen so that the marginal cost of holding bank
capital in excess (the bank capital bu®er) equals the marginal gain. The marginal cost is given
by the terms RL
t ¡Rt¨t, which is the opportunity cost of not increasing loans. The right-hand
terms in equation (22) indicate that the marginal gain is equal to the decrease in the bank
capital premium associated with holding an extra dollar as a bank capital bu®er. Thus, the
marginal gain is simply the decrease in the cost of raising bank equity in the ¯nancial market
due to holding an excess bank capital (the decline in the ¯nancial market risk premium).
The marginal cost of producing loans, ³t, is the weighted sum of the marginal cost of














Since lending banks operate in a perfectly competitive market, the gross nominal lending rate
they charge to entrepreneurs is equal to the marginal cost of producing loans. Therefore,
RL
t = ³t. The marginal cost increases in both risk premia a®ecting the interbank and bank
capital ¯nancial markets; i.e., ¨t and ¥t. Consequently, credit frictions in these markets have
direct implications for the costs of providing loans to ¯rms.
2.3 Production sector
2.3.1 Entrepreneurs
The entrepreneurs' behaviour follows that in BGG. Entrepreneurs, who manage ¯rms that
produce wholesale goods, are risk neutral and have a ¯nite expected horizon for planning
18purposes. The probability that an entrepreneur will survive until the next period is º. This
assumption ensures that an entrepreneur's net worth (the ¯rm equity) alone is never su±cient
to ¯nance new capital acquisitions, and so the entrepreneur must borrow to ¯nance investment.
At the end of each period, the entrepreneur purchases capital, Kt+1, to be used in the next
period, at the real price QK
t . Capital acquisition is ¯nanced partly by net worth, Nt, and the
remainder by borrowing Lt = QK
t Kt+1 ¡ Nt from lending banks.
The entrepreneurs' demand for capital depends on the expected marginal return and the
expected marginal external ¯nancing cost at t + 1, EtFt+1, which equals the real interest rate










where ± is the capital depreciation rate. The expected marginal return of capital is given by
the right-side terms of (26), where rK
t+1 is the marginal productivity of capital at t + 1 and
(1 ¡ ±)QK
t+1 is the value of one unit of capital used in t + 1.
BGG solve a ¯nancial contract that maximizes the payo® to the entrepreneur, subject to
the lender earning the required rate of return. BGG show that|given the parameter values
associated with the cost of monitoring the borrower, the characteristics of the distribution
of entrepreneurial returns, and the expected life span of ¯rms|the optimal debt contracts
between banks and entrepreneurs imply an external ¯nance premium, ª(¢), which depends on
the entrepreneur's leverage ratio. The underlying parameter values determine the elasticity of
the external ¯nance premium with respect to ¯rm leverage.
In our framework, the marginal external ¯nancing cost is equal to the gross real prime
lending rate plus an external ¯nance premium. Thus, the demand for capital should satisfy















is an expected real prime lending rate, with RL
t set by the lending bank. The
external ¯nance premium is given by
rpE








19where ª0(¢) < 0 and ª(1) = 1, and Ãt represents an aggregate riskiness shock, as in Christiano,
Motto, and Rostagno (2010).
The external ¯nance premium, ª(¢), depends on the borrower's equity stake in a project
(or, alternatively, the borrower's leverage ratio). As QK
t Kt+1=Nt increases, the borrower in-
creasingly relies on uncollateralized borrowing (higher leverage) to fund the project. Since this
raises the incentive to misreport the outcome of the project, the loan becomes riskier, and the
cost of borrowing rises.30 Speci¯cally, the external ¯nance premium is assumed to have the
following functional form:
rpE







where Ãt is the time-varying elasticity of the external ¯nance premium with respect to the
entrepreneurs' leverage ratio. Following Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010), we assume
that Ãt, the aggregate riskiness shock, follows an AR(1) process. BGG show that this elasticity
depends on the standard deviation of the distribution of the entrepreneurs' idiosyncratic shocks,
the agency costs, and the entrepreneurs' default threshold. Therefore, a positive shock to Ãt
may result from exogenous increases in the distribution of entrepreneurs' idiosyncratic shocks,
the agency costs, and/or the entrepreneurs' default threshold. The result is a rise in Ãt and
thus the external ¯nance premium.31
Aggregate entrepreneurial net worth evolves according to
Nt = ºVt + (1 ¡ º)gt; (30)
where Vt denotes the net worth of surviving entrepreneurs net of borrowing costs carried over
from the previous period, 1¡º is the share of new entrepreneurs entering the economy, and gt
is the transfer or \seed money" that new entrepreneurs receive from entrepreneurs who exit.32








30When the riskiness of loans increases, the agency costs rise and the lender's expected losses increase. A
higher external ¯nance premium paid by successful entrepreneurs o®sets these higher expected losses.
31A positive shock to the standard deviation widens the entrepreneurs' distribution, and so lending banks are
unable to distinguish the quality of the entrepreneurs.
32The parameter º will a®ect the persistence of changes in net worth.














is the cost of borrowing (the interest rate in the loan contract signed at time t ¡ 1). Earnings
from operations in this period become the next period's net worth. In our formulation, borrow-
ers sign a debt contract that speci¯es a nominal interest rate.33 Loan repayment (in real terms)
will then depend on the realized in°ation rate. An unanticipated increase (decrease) in in°a-
tion will reduce (increase) the real cost of debt repayment and, therefore, increase (decrease)
entrepreneurial net worth.
To produce output Yt, the entrepreneur uses Kt units of capital and Ht units of labour
following a constant-returns-to-scale technology:
Yt · AtK®
t H1¡®
t ; ® 2 (0;1); (33)
where At is a technology shock common to all entrepreneurs and is assumed to follow a sta-
tionary AR(1) process. Each entrepreneur sells his or her output in a perfectly competitive
wholesale-good market for a price that equals the entrepreneur's nominal marginal cost. The
entrepreneur maximizes pro¯ts by choosing Kt and Ht subject to the production function (33).
See Appendix A for the entrepreneur's ¯rst-order conditions.
2.3.2 Capital producers
Capital producers use a linear technology, subject to an investment-speci¯c shock xt, to produce
physical capital, Kt+1. They use a fraction of the ¯nal goods purchased from retailers as
investment goods, It, and the existing capital stock to produce new capital. The new capital
replaces depreciated capital and adds to the capital stock. At the end of period t, the entire
stock of capital is sold to the entrepreneurs to be used in the production of wholesale goods in
the next period, t + 1.
The capital producers' optimization problem, in real terms, consists of choosing the quantity


























33In BGG, the contract is speci¯ed in terms of the real interest rate.
21The disturbance xt is a shock to the marginal e±ciency of investment and is assumed to follow
an AR(1) process. Since It is expressed in consumption units, xt in°uences the amount of
capital in e±ciency units that can be purchased for one unit of consumption. Capital producers








ÂI > 0 is the investment adjustment cost parameter.






























which is the standard Tobin's Q equation that relates the price of capital to the marginal
adjustment cost.34
The quantity and price of capital are determined in the capital market. The entrepreneurial
demand curve for capital is obtained from equation (27) and, in Appendix A, equation (A.4),
whereas the supply of capital is given by equation (35). The intersection of these curves gives
the market-clearing quantity and price of capital. Capital adjustment costs slow down the
response of investment to shocks, which directly a®ects the price of capital. In addition, the
aggregate capital stock evolves according to










The retail sector is used to introduce nominal price rigidity into the economy. Retail ¯rms
purchase wholesale goods at a price equal to their nominal marginal cost, and di®erentiate
them at no cost. They then sell these di®erentiated retail goods in a monopolistically com-
petitive market. Following Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996), we assume that each retailer does
not reoptimize its selling price unless it receives a random signal. The constant probability of
receiving such a signal is (1 ¡ Áp); and, with probability Áp, retailer j must charge the same
price as in the preceding period, indexed to the steady-state gross rate of in°ation, ¼. At time
34Note that, in the absence of investment adjustment costs, the capital price Q
K
t is constant and equals 1. In-
vestment adjustment costs generate capital price variability, which contributes to the volatility of entrepreneurial
net worth.
22t, if retailer j receives the signal to reoptimize, it chooses a price e Pt(j) that maximizes the
discounted, expected real total pro¯ts for l periods.
2.4 Central bank and government
2.4.1 Central bank
We assume that the central bank adjusts the policy rate, Rt, in response to deviations of
in°ation and output from their steady-state values. Thus, monetary policy evolves according
to the following Taylor-type policy rule:
log(Rt=R) = %¼ log(¼t=¼) + %Y log(Yt=Y ) + "Rt; (37)
where R, ¼, and Y are the steady-state values of Rt, ¼t, and Yt, respectively, and "Rt is a
monetary policy shock normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviation ¾R.
During a period of ¯nancial stress, the central bank can use unconventional monetary policy
by injecting money into the banking system, mt.
2.4.2 Government
In each period, the government buys a fraction of the ¯nal retail good, Gt, pays the principal
debt from the previous period, and makes interest payments. We assume that the government
runs a balanced budget ¯nanced with newly contracted debt and lump-sum taxes, e Tw
t + e Tb
t .






Rt¡1=¼t = Bt + BL
t + e Tw
t + e Tb
t ; (38)
where Bt and BL
t are government bonds held by households (bankers) and lending banks,
respectively. We assume that government spending, Gt, follows an AR(1) process.
2.5 Markets clearing
Under Ricardian equivalence, government bonds held by bankers are equal to zero, and so Bt =
0 in equilibrium. The newly created money is transferred to workers, so that Tt = Dt¡Dt¡1=¼t:
The resource constraint implies that Yt = Cw
t + Cb
t + It + Gt: Finally, total consumption, Ct,




Apart from the monetary policy shock, "Rt, which is a zero-mean i.i.d. shock with a standard
deviation ¾R, the other structural shocks follow AR(1) processes:
log(Xt) = (1 ¡ ½X)log(X) + ½X log(Xt¡1) + "Xt; (39)
where Xt = fAt;xt;et;Gt;Ãt;¡t;¹t;mtg, X > 0 is the steady-state value of Xt, ½X 2 (¡1;1),
and "Xt is normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviation ¾X.
3. Calibration
Following Dib (2010), we calibrate the model's parameters to capture the key features of
the U.S. economy, using quarterly data, for the period 1980Q1{2008Q4. Table 2 reports the
calibration values. The steady-state gross in°ation rate, ¼, is set equal to 1:0075, which is the
historical average in the sample. The discount factors, ¯w and ¯b, are set to 0.9989 and 0.9949
to match the historical averages of nominal deposit and risk-free interest rates, RD
t and Rt
(see Table 3 for the steady-state values of some key variables). The risk-aversion parameters
in workers' and bankers' utility functions, °w and °b, are set to 3 and 2, respectively, since
we assume that workers are more risk averse than bankers. Assuming that workers allocate
one third of their time to market activities, we set ´, the parameter determining the weight
of leisure in utility, and &, the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of labour,
to 0.996 and 1, respectively. The habit formation parameter, ', is set to 0.65, as estimated in
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010).
The capital share in aggregate output production, ®, and the capital depreciation rate, ±,
are set to 0.33 and 0.025, respectively (values commonly used in the literature). The parameter
measuring the degree of monopoly power in the retail goods market µ is set to 6, which implies
a 20 per cent markup in the steady-state equilibrium. The parameter #D, which measures the
degree of monopoly power of the savings banks, is set equal to 2.2. This value is set to match
the historical average of the deposit rate, RD
t .
The nominal price rigidity parameter, Áp, in the Calvo-Yun price contract is set to 0.75,
implying that the average price remains unchanged for four quarters. This value is that es-
timated by Christensen and Dib (2008) for the U.S. economy and is commonly used in the
24literature. The parameter of the adjustment costs of the deposit interest rate, ÁR, is set to 2.4
to match the standard deviation of the deposit rate to that observed in the data.
Monetary policy parameters %¼ and %Y are 1.5 and 0.05, respectively; these values satisfy
the Taylor principle. The standard deviation of monetary policy shock, ¾R, is given the usually
estimated value of 0.006.
Following BGG, the steady-state leverage ratio of entrepreneurs, 1 ¡ N=K, is set to 0.5,
matching the historical average. The probability of entrepreneurial survival to the next quarter,
º, is set at 0.9833, while Ã, the steady-state elasticity of the external ¯nance premium, is set
at 0.05, the value used by BGG and close to that estimated by Christensen and Dib (2008).35
Similarly, we calibrate À, the elasticity of the interbank premium with respect to the ratio of
total interbank borrowing to risk-weighted assets, at 0.05, assuming that it is similar to the
one used in the entrepreneurs' external ¯nance premium.
We set », the elasticity of the bank capital premium, at 2.2, so that the steady-state value
of the bank capital premium, ¥, is 1.0025 (1 per cent in annual terms). In contrast, we set the
steady-state bank's leverage ratio, ·, at 11.5 to match that observed in the U.S. data. Based on
the Basel II minimum required bank capital ratio of 8 per cent, we assume that the maximum
imposed bank leverage, ¹ ·, is 12.5.36
We calibrate the shocks' process parameters using either values in previous studies or es-
timated values. The parameters of technology, preference, and investment-speci¯c shocks are
calibrated using the estimated values in Christensen and Dib (2008). To calibrate the param-
eters of the government spending process, we use an OLS estimation of government spending
in real per capita terms (see Appendix B). The estimated values of ½G, the autocorrelation
coe±cient, is 0.81, while the estimated standard error, ¾G, is 0.0166.
To calibrate the parameters of the riskiness shock process Ãt, we set the autocorrelation
coe±cient ½Ã to 0.83, the estimated value in Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010), while
the standard deviation ¾Ã is set to 0.05 to match the volatility of the external risk premium
to that observed in the data, measured as the di®erence between Moody's BAA and AAA cor-
porate bond yields, as in Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010). We set the autocorrelation
35Christensen and Dib (2008) estimate Ã at 0.046 for the U.S. economy.
36The maximum bank leverage ratio is simply the inverse of the minimum required bank capital ratio, which
is 8 per cent in the Basel II Accord.
25coe±cient and the standard deviation of the ¯nancial intermediation process, ½¡ and ¾¡, to
0.8 and 0.003, respectively. These values are motivated by the potential persistence and low
volatility of this type of ¯nancial shock.37 Finally, we set the autocorrelation coe±cients of
the injection of money and haircut rate shocks, ½m and ½¹, equal to 0.5, and their standard
deviations, ¾m and ¾¹, to 0.
4. Impulse Responses
To assess the contribution of frictions in the interbank and bank capital markets, we plot
and compare the impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to demand, supply, and
¯nancial shocks in four models: (1) the model with no ¯nancial frictions (the NoFF model);
(2) the model with only a ¯nancial accelerator in the production sector, as in BGG (the FA
model); (3) the model with a ¯nancial accelerator in the production sector and bank capital
(the FABC model);38 and (4) the full baseline model, described above, that includes both the
bank capital and interbank markets (the BS model).
Figures 1 and 2 depict the impulse responses to technology and monetary policy shocks,
respectively. Figures 3{5 report the impulse responses to riskiness, ¯nancial intermediation,
and haircut shocks. Each variable's response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its
steady-state level.
4.1 Responses to technology and monetary policy shocks
As in previous studies, incorporating the ¯nancial accelerator mechanism µ a la BGG in the de-
mand side of the credit market ampli¯es and propagates the dynamic e®ects of standard supply
and demand shocks, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 (the FA versus the NoFF model). Never-
theless, Figure 1 shows that the ¯nancial accelerator only moderately ampli¯es and propagates
the impact of technology shocks on output and consumption. This results from debt de°ation
37In future work, we will estimate the model's structural parameters using either a maximum-likelihood
procedure, as used in Christensen and Dib (2008), or a Bayesien approach, as used in Christiano, Motto, and
Rostagno (2010), Queijo von Heideken (2009), and others.
38In this model, in addition to the ¯nancial accelerator µ a la BGG, we incorporate frictions in the bank capital
market by assuming an adverse selection problem that arises from imperfect information between bank investors
and lending banks. In the FABC model, we turn o® the interbank market acceleration mechanism by setting
the interbank premium equal to its steady-state value.
26e®ects.39 Following a positive technology shock, output increases, while prices decrease, push-
ing down the in°ation rate. The decline in in°ation increases the real costs of repaying existing
debt, which erodes a part of the increase in entrepreneurs' net worth and results in a smaller
decline in the external ¯nance premium. Therefore, the response of investment is slightly larger
in the FA model compared to that in the NoFF model, since the costs of borrowing are smaller.
In contrast, following a monetary policy shock, the implication of the ¯nancial acceleration
mechanism is obvious, because output and prices move in the same direction. Figure 2 shows
that, following a tightening shock of monetary policy, output and in°ation fall in both NoFF
and FA models, but by much more in the latter case, particularly in the longer term. Lower
output and lower in°ation exacerbate negative e®ects on entrepreneurs' net worth, which leads
to a signi¯cant increase in the external ¯nance premium. This triggers a substantial and
persistent drop in investment, consumption, and output. Consequently, aggregate responses to
the monetary policy shock are substantially ampli¯ed and propagated in the FA model.
We next examine the implications of frictions in the bank capital market, under the capital
requirement and a constant interbank premium. We compare the dynamic e®ects of technology
and monetary policy shocks generated in the FABC model to those in the FA model. Figures 1
and 2 show that adding frictions in bank capital, which is used to satisfy capital adequacy and
to solve the adverse selection problem in the bank capital market (the FABC model), dampens
the real impacts of technology and monetary policy shocks on output and investment. This is
due to the fact that bank capital is a perfect complement to deposits. Therefore, following a
positive technology shock, entrepreneurs' net worth increases and the external ¯nance premium
decreases. Demand for investment increases and entrepreneurs increase their borrowing to
¯nance investment expansions, and so loans increase. Nevertheless, to extend loans to meet
the demand of ¯rms, lending banks have to increase their bank capital holdings to satisfy the
capital requirement, or increase their leverage ratio and reduce their capital bu®er.
Both actions are costly for lending banks. The increase in the demand for new bank
capital increases the cost of raising bank equity (particularly, the prices of bank capital) in
the ¯nancial market. Similarly, an increase in the banks' leverage ratio reduces the capital
bu®er and increases the probability of default. Consequently, the bank capital premium paid
39This result is similar to the results in Christensen and Dib (2008); Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010);
and Queijo von Heideken (2009).
27by lending banks rises, as well as the marginal costs of producing loans and lending rates. The
higher lending costs erode the increase in the ¯rms' net worth, thereby reducing ¯rms' demand
for investment and partially o®setting an increase in investment.
Therefore, in this framework, bank capital acts as an \attenuation mechanism," because
bank capital is held to satisfy the capital requirement. In addition, the need to hold excess
bank capital, due to imperfect information in the bank capital market, reduces the supply of
loanable funds from lending banks.
We analyze the role of the frictions in the interbank market as a transmission and prop-
agation mechanism of aggregate shocks. These e®ects arise from the endogenous interbank
premium that depends on the banks' balance sheet position, which directly a®ects the inter-
bank borrowing costs. Figures 1 and 2 show that, when considering frictions in the interbank
market, the attenuation e®ect implied by the capital requirement is mostly o®set in the base-
line model, since the responses of output and investment in the baseline model are much larger
than in the FABC model. Consequently, the interbank market frictions amplify and propagate
the real impacts of the shocks and generate an acceleration e®ect similar to that in the BGG
framework. This result is similar to the previous studies that incorporate bank capital to solve
the asymmetric information between households and banks.40
The interbank market frictions mechanism works as follows. A positive technology shock
increases entrepreneurs' demand for loans, implying a need to increase bank capital to satisfy
the regulatory requirement. As in the FABC model, the increase in the demand for bank
capital raises the marginal cost of producing loans. Nonetheless, higher bank capital holdings
raise banks' collateral, which, in turn, reduces the cost of borrowing in the interbank market.
As shown in Figure 1, the decline in interbank borrowing costs reduces the cost of raising bank
capital, and allows banks to supply cheaper loans to entrepreneurs. Therefore, ¯rms' net worth
increases and the external premium falls by more in the baseline model, compared to the FABC
model. This leads to larger e®ects of shocks on output and investment in the baseline model.
Figure 1 shows that, following a positive technology shock, the increase in bank capital is
much smaller in the baseline model than in the FABC model, implying a lower cost of raising
bank capital. Moreover, the interbank premium declines sharply in the baseline model, while
40For example, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010); Hirakata, Sudo, and Ueda (2009); Meh and Moran (2010); Zhang
(2009).
28the bank capital premium increases. Therefore, in the presence of frictions in the interbank
market, an increase in lending banks' asset holdings reduces the costs of borrowing in the
interbank markets and mitigates the dampening impact of the capital requirement.
In addition, following a positive technology shock, lending banks respond by sharply in-
creasing their leverage ratio in the baseline model, whereas they slightly decrease it in the
FABC model. The sharp increase in the leverage ratio in the baseline model is explained by
the drop in the marginal cost of providing loans caused by the decline in the interbank risk
premium. Therefore, lending banks take advantage by extending their loan supply. We also
note that bank capital increases in both models; however, the increase is gradual and persis-
tent in the baseline model, while it is substantial and short-lived in the FABC model. In the
baseline model, the interbank premium drops sharply on impact, as a result of an improvement
in lending banks' balance sheets (an increase in bank capital and loans). The bank capital
premium increases sharply on impact, because of the reduced bank capital bu®er resulting
from the jump in the bank leverage ratio.
The responses of the lending and deposit rates are very similar in both the FABC and
baseline models. Following a positive technology shock, the prime lending rate decreases to
accommodate the shock, because of the drop in the marginal costs of producing loans. Also,
the deposit rate decreases, but by less than the policy rate. This is due to the adjustment costs
of changing the deposit rate, which implies a partial pass-through of policy rate variations to
deposit rates.
Figure 2 plots the responses to a shock resulting from a tightening of monetary policy by 1
per cent. In response to this shock, the nominal interest rate increases sharply, and output and
investment fall persistently. In the FABC model, following a tightening of monetary policy, net
worth drops by less than in the baseline model, because capital prices rise by less. Therefore, the
external ¯nance premium increases by less, re°ecting the increase in ¯rms' leverage, and leading
to a lower cost of lending. The relatively lower funding cost of purchasing new capital limits the
drop in demand for investment. On the other hand, when allowing for frictions in the interbank
market, the attenuation e®ects implied by the capital requirement are o®set, and the impact
of a tightening of monetary policy is signi¯cantly ampli¯ed and propagated to macro variables.
Therefore, incorporating frictions in the interbank market o®sets the dampening e®ects of the
29capital requirement, and implies signi¯cant ampli¯cations and propagations of the impacts of
monetary policy shocks on output, investment, net worth, and loans; the responses of these
variables in the baseline model are almost twice as large as in the FABC model, and they are
more persistent.
Figure 2 also shows that a shock resulting from a tightening of monetary policy moves the
deposit and prime lending rates in the same direction. They both increase on impact. The
bank leverage ratio falls on impact, and lending banks hold more capital. This e®ect results in
a decrease in the default on bank capital.
4.2 Responses to ¯nancial shocks
Figure 3 depicts the impulse responses to a 10 per cent riskiness shock in the FA, FABC, and
baseline models. This shock may be interpreted as an exogenous increase in the degree of
riskiness in the entrepreneurial sector. It is generated by either an increase in the standard
deviation of the entrepreneurial distribution or by an increase in agency costs paid by lending
banks to monitor entrepreneurs in e®orts to reduce asymmetric information. In response to this
shock, output, investment, net worth, and prices of capital fall persistently below their steady-
state levels in both models. Consumption, however, responds positively to the riskiness shock
in the short run, before decreasing at longer horizons. We note that the responses of output
and investment are substantially dampened in the FABC model, while they are ampli¯ed in
the model incorporating frictions in the interbank market (the baseline model).
The impacts of riskiness shocks in the baseline and FA models are much larger than in the
FABC model, implying that frictions in bank capital play a substantial role in dampening the
impacts of these shocks and contribute to macroeconomic stability. Note also that the external
¯nance premium rises in response to riskiness shocks, while loans temporarily decline, before
jumping above their steady-state level, and then decrease in the long run.41 To accommodate
the shift in the demand for loans, lending banks decrease their leverage ratio on impact, and
then slightly increase it over the medium term, before persistently reducing it in the longer
term.
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses to a 1 per cent positive ¯nancial intermediation shock
41Loans increase in the medium term and then decrease in the long term to smooth changes in investment
and reduce the costs of adjusting investment across periods.
30in the FABC and baseline models. This raises the credit supply without varying the inputs
used in the loan production function. In response to this shock, loans gradually but persistently
increase, re°ecting the persistent decline in the costs of borrowing. These costs decline because
of the decrease in the marginal cost of providing loans and the fall in the monetary policy rate
induced by the monetary authority's response to the decline in in°ation. At the same time,
output, investment, and net worth positively respond to this shock. We also note that the
bank leverage ratio is counter-cyclical, and the external ¯nance premium, deposit, and prime
lending rates respond negatively to the shock. The instantaneous decline in the prime lending
rate accommodates the excess loan supply generated by the positive ¯nancial intermediary
shock.
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses to a 100 per cent exogenous increase in the haircut
rate, ¹t, in the baseline model. This re°ects the changes in the con¯dence level of savings
banks in the riskiness and the health of the lending banks. The shock substantially increases
the interbank premium, by four times on impact. This raises the costs of interbank borrowing,
since lending banks have to pay a higher risk premium to borrow from savings banks. This leads
to a signi¯cant increase in the lending rate, which pushes up the external cost of borrowing for
entrepreneurs and lowers net worth. Entrepreneurs react to this shock by cutting investment.
This gradually decreases output. In°ation, the policy rate, and the external ¯nance premium
rise in the baseline model. We note that loans increase in the short term, but fall in the long
term. Thus, ¯rms with deteriorated net worth increase their borrowing to ¯nance their capital
acquisition in the short run, even at a higher cost for external ¯nancing. Banks respond to
this shock by reducing their leverage ratio, holding a higher bank capital bu®er, and increasing
their bank capital holdings.
Finally, Figure 6 depicts the impulse responses to a 10 per cent quantitative monetary easing
shock, mt, a positive injection of money into lending banks. The shock causes a substantial
decline in the demand for interbank borrowing and bank capital, because banks prefer to rely
on cheaper funds from the central bank. The lending banks reduce their prime lending rate to
accommodate the impact of this expansionary monetary shock. Therefore, output, investment,
and net worth gradually increase in both the FABC and baseline models, while in°ation, the
policy rate, and loans decline in the FABC model and slightly increase in the baseline model.
31In the baseline model, the decline in the demand for interbank borrowing and bank capital
reduces the interbank risk premium and increases the bank leverage ratio. The decrease in
the interbank risk premium reduces the costs of raising funds in the interbank market, which
reduces the marginal costs of producing loans. Nevertheless, a higher leverage ratio implies
a lower bank capital bu®er and, therefore, a larger bank equity premium. This increases the
marginal costs of raising bank capital, and thus increases the costs of producing loans. Figure
6 shows that the increase in the costs of raising bank capital outweighs those of interbank
borrowing, and so the drop of the lending rate is smaller in the baseline model, relative to the
FABC model. Consequently, the response of real variables to this quantitative monetary easing
shock is dampened in the baseline model.
5. Conclusion
The recent ¯nancial crisis has shown the need to develop DSGE models that incorporate ¯-
nancial frictions in both the demand and the supply sides of credit markets. Incorporating
such frictions and an active banking sector allows policy-makers to understand the role of real-
¯nancial linkages in the transmission and propagation of real shocks. It also enables empirical
assessment of the contribution of ¯nancial shocks originating in the banking sector to aggregate
°uctuations.
This paper proposes a micro-founded framework to incorporate ¯nancial frictions into the
interbank and bank capital markets using a DSGE framework. It introduces bank capital
to satisfy the capital requirement imposed by regulators. Financial frictions are modelled
by assuming imperfect information (asymmetric information) between lenders and borrowers,
which creates a moral hazard and adverse selection problems in the interbank and bank capital
markets.
To assess the role and importance of ¯nancial frictions and the capital requirement, we
simulate four models. The main ¯ndings are that ¯nancial frictions in the interbank and bank
capital markets amplify and propagate the real e®ects of di®erent shocks, while the capital
requirement allows bank capital to act as an attenuation mechanism that dampens substantially
the real e®ects of shocks and helps to stabilize the economy.
This model provides a rich and rigorous framework to address monetary and ¯nancial sta-
32bility issues, since it includes both the demand and the supply sides of the credit market.
This allows for policy simulation analysis of factors such as bank capital regulations, interest
rate spreads, and the optimal choice for banks' leverage ratios. The model can be used to
address policy and ¯nancial stability issues, such as bank capital adequacy regulations and
the e±ciency versus stability of the banking sector. Future work will consist of estimating the
model's structural parameters, incorporating credit to households, and extending the frame-
work to an open-economy setting.
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36Table 2: Parameter Calibration: Baseline model
Preferences
¯w = 0.9989, ¯b = 0.9949, °w = 3, °b = 2,
' = 0.65, ´ = 0.996, & = 1,
Monetary policy
%¼ = 1.5, %Y = 0.05, ¾R = 0.006,
Technologies
® = 0.33, ± = 0.025, µ = 6, #D = 2.2,
Adjustment and default costs
ÂI = 12, ÂZ = 4, Â±Z = 1648,
Nominal rigidities
Áp = 0.75, ÁR = 2.4,
Financial sector
º = 0.9833, Ã = 0.05, K=N = 2, ¹ · = 12:5;
À = 0.05, » = 2.2,
Exogenous processes
A = 1, ½A = 0.8, ¾A = 0.009,
¨ = 1, ½¨ = 0.7, ¾¨ = 0.033,
e = 1, ½e = 0.8, ¾e = 0.0073,
G=Y = 0.17, ½G = 0.81, ¾G = 0.0166,
Ã = 0.05, ½Ã = 0.83, ¾Ã = 0.050,
¡ = 1, ½¡ = 0.8, ¾¡ = 0.003,
¹ = 0.90, ½¹ = 0.5, ¾¹ = 0.00,
m = 0, ½m = 0.5, ¾m = 0.00




R policy rate 1.0141
RD deposit rate 1.0097
RL prime lending 1.0220
· bank leverage ratio 11.5
±Z default on bank capital 0.0025
rpE ¯rm's external ¯nance premium 1.0027
rpB interbank ¯nance premium 1.0023
rp· bank capital ¯nance premium 1.0025
B. Steady-state ratios
C=Y consumption to output 0.661
Cw=Y workers' consumption to output 0.624
Cb=Y bankers' consumption to output 0.037
I=Y investment to output 0.16
G=Y government spending to output 0.17
K=Y capital stock to output 6.753
Z=Y bank capital to output 0.294
K=N capital to entrepreneurs' net worth 2
s interbank borrowing to deposits 0.87
38Figure 1: Responses to a 1 Per Cent Positive Technology Shock
















































































39Figure 2: Responses to a 1 Per Cent Tightening Monetary Policy Shock
















































































40Figure 3: Responses to a 10 Per Cent Increase in the Riskiness Shock

















































































41Figure 4: Responses to a 1 Per Cent Positive Financial Intermediation Shock









































































42Figure 5: Responses to a 100 Per Cent Increase in the Haircut Shock






























































































































































44Appendix A: First-Order Conditions
A.1. Workers' ¯rst-order conditions






































t is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint.
A.2. Entrepreneurs' ¯rst-order conditions













where mct > 0 is the real marginal cost.
A.3. The retailer's optimization problem



















42This demand function is derived from the de¯nition of aggregate demand as the composite of individual ¯nal












1¡µ ; where Yt+l(j) and Pt+l(j) are the demand and
price faced by each individual retailer j 2 (0;1).




¼l e Pt(j) ¡ Pt+lmct+l
´
Yt+l(j)=Pt+l: (A.9)













The aggregate price is
P1¡µ
t = Áp(¼Pt¡1)1¡µ + (1 ¡ Áp)e P1¡µ
t : (A.11)
These lead to the following equation:
^ ¼t = ¯wEt^ ¼t+1 +
(1 ¡ ¯wÁp)(1 ¡ Áp)
Áp
^ mct; (A.12)
where »t is the real marginal cost, and variables with hats are log deviations from the steady-
state values (such as ^ ¼t = log(¼t=¼)).
46Appendix B: Data
1. Loans are measured by Commercial and Industrial Loans of all Commercial Banks (BUS-
LOANS), quarterly and seasonally adjusted;
2. The external ¯nance premium is measured by the di®erence between the Moody's BAA
and AAA corporate bond yields;
3. In°ation is measured by quarterly changes in the GDP de°ator (¢log(GDPD));
4. The prime lending rate is measured by the Bank Prime Loan Rate (MPRIME);
5. The monetary policy rate is measured by the 3-Month Treasury Bill (TB3MS);
6. The deposit rate is measured by the weighted average of the rates received on the interest-
bearing assets included in M2 (M2OWN);
7. The real money stock is measured by the real M2 money stock per capita;
8. Output is measured by real GDP per capita;
9. Total consumption is measured by Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCEC);
10. Investment is measured by Gross Private Domestic Investment (GPDI);
11. Government spending is measured by output minus consumption and investment (GDP
- PCEC- GPDI).
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